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I.  Introduction  
                                                                                                     
  J.D. Candidate, Washington and Lee University School of Law, 2015; B.A. 
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On January 2, 2014, Sergio Garcia became the first known 
undocumented immigrant in the United States with a license to practice 
law.  He arrived in the United States as an infant in the late 1970’s, after his 
father arranged for a couple with United States citizenship to pose as his 
parents and bring him across the United States-Mexico border.
1
  Upon 
arrival, Mr. Garcia lived with his parents and five siblings in Chico, 
California until age nine, when he returned to Mexico with his mother.
2
 At 
age seventeen, Mr. Garcia came back to the United States, entering the 
country illegally, lying on the floorboards of a pick-up truck.
3
  Now thirty-
six years old, Mr. Garcia has since graduated from the California Northern 
School of Law, passed the California state bar exam, and was granted 
admission to the State Bar of California in 2009.
4
  Although his law license 
was rescinded two weeks later because of his immigration status,
5
 a 
California law enacted in October 2013 made it possible for Mr. Garcia to 
regain his license and become the first known undocumented immigrant 
admitted to any state bar in the country.
6
 Others like him, however, have 
not had similar success.
7
 
On March 6, 2014, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that 
twenty-six-year-old Jose Godinez-Samperio was ineligible for admission to 
the Florida State Bar because of his status as an undocumented immigrant.  
Mr. Godinez-Samperio came to the United States with his parents at age 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Deborah Hastings, Undocumented Immigrants May Practice Law Under New 
California Legislation Spurred by Sergio Garcia’s Long, Tortured Quest, N.Y. DAILY NEWS 
(Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/spurred-man-tortured-journey-
california-state-undocumented-immigrants-lawyers-article-1.1482225. 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. 
 4. See Robin Abcarian, Sergio Garcia Will Practice Law, and He Will Make a 
Killing, L.A.TIMES (Sept. 6, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/06/local/la-me-ln-
sergio-garcia-law-20130906 (noting that Mr. Garcia had about fifteen Spanish-speaking 
clients during that two-week period before his law license was rescinded).   
 5. See Cindy Y. Rodriguez & Jacqueline Hurtado, Undocumented Immigrant’s Bid 
for California Law License Heads to Court, CNN (Sept. 4, 2013, 7:56 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/04/us/undocumented-lawyer-law-license/.  
 6. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, Court Grants Law License to Man in US Illegally (Jan. 2, 
2014, 6:50 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/calif-rule-law-license-immigrant (reporting 
that the unanimous ruling of the California Supreme Court is one “advocates hope will open 
the door to millions of immigrants seeking to enter other professions such as medicine, 
accounting and teaching.”).  
 7. See id. (reporting that “the court made clear the only reason it granted Garcia’s 
request is that California recently approved a law that specifically authorizes the state to give 
law licenses to immigrants who are here illegally.”).  
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nine, and has since remained in the country permanently.
8
 His family 
entered the United States with tourist visas, but never returned to their 
home country of Mexico.
9
 Growing up in Florida, Mr. Godinez-Samperio 
went on to become valedictorian of his high school class, earned a 
scholarship to the New College of Florida and graduated from the Florida 
State University School of Law with honors.
10
  Despite those 
accomplishments, the Florida Supreme Court determined that without a 
state law like the one that prompted Mr. Garcia’s case, federal law prohibits 
Mr. Godinez-Samperio’s admission to the Florida State Bar because of his 
status as an undocumented immigrant.
11
 
This Note will examine how inconsistencies in immigration policy on 
education, employment, and professional licensure impact undocumented 
immigrants who have been raised and educated in the United States, and 
chose to pursue a degree in law.  Although the federal government and 
many states have taken steps to encourage education for children brought to 
this country illegally, a 1996 federal prohibition on “public benefits” for 
undocumented immigrants, which tangentially includes law licenses, 
creates a professional glass ceiling for United States-educated young people 
seeking to enter the legal profession.  The discussion that follows will 
examine existing law governing education and employment for 
undocumented students, with an emphasis on those studying to practice 
law.
12
  It will explain the disconnect between immigration policies that 
allow United States-educated undocumented students to attend college, earn 
a law degree, and gain employment, and a federal law that prohibits those 
same students from obtaining the license required for their chosen 
profession.
13
  Finally, this Note recommends that the Department of 
Homeland Security promulgate a regulation interpreting the federal 
prohibition on “public benefits” to permit state bar eligibility for young 
people who qualify for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
                                                                                                     
 8. See Bill Kaczor, Illegal Immigrant in Fla. Fights for Law License, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Oct. 2, 2012, 6:23 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/fla-justices-question-law-
license-immigrant.  
 9. See id.  
 10. See Chelsea Silvia, A Pathway to the Legal Profession, 45 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. 
REV. 367, 368 (2014).  
 11. See Fla. Bd. Bar Exam’rs Re Question as to Whether Undocumented Immigrants 
are Eligible for Admission to the Fla. Bar, 134 So.3d 432, 437 (Fla. 2014) (holding that 
unauthorized immigrants are ineligible for admission to the Florida State Bar).  
 12. See infra Part IV.A.  
 13. See infra Part III.  
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(DACA) program.
14
 Currently, DACA provides temporary relief from the 
threat of deportation, and offers an opportunity for United States-educated 
undocumented immigrants to seek lawful employment in the United States.  
This Note will argue those employment opportunities should include a 
chance to enter the legal profession as well.
15
   
II.  Background 
A.  Classifying Immigrants in the United States 
At the outset, it is important to consider the various classifications 
given to those living in the United States who were not born in this country. 
Under federal immigration law, those who are not natural-born citizens are 
considered “aliens.”
16
  The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
classifies aliens as either “immigrants” or “nonimmigrants” depending on 
the purpose and length of their stay in the United States.
17
  
“Nonimmigrants” enter the country on a temporary basis, usually for 
tourism, work or education, and must demonstrate an intention to leave the 
country at the end of their authorized stay.
18
  “Immigrants” are those who 
intend to live permanently in the United States.
19
 Immigrants with an 
immigrant visa, typically referred to as a “green card,” have legal 
permanent resident status in the United States.
20
 Legal permanent residents 
are authorized to live and work in the United States permanently.
21
 
“Undocumented” describes those living in the United States without any 
type of legal status. It includes those who entered the country illegally, like 
                                                                                                     
 14. See infra Part IV.B., note 158.  
 15. See infra Part IV.B.  
 16. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(3) (2010).  
 17. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15) (2010). 
 18. See Glossary of Terms, IMMIGRATION EQUALITY, http://immigrationequality. 
org/get-legal-help/our-legal-resources/immigration-101/glossary-of-terms/ (last visited Feb. 
11, 2015) (“Many non-immigrant visas require applicants to prove that they do not intend to 
remain in the U.S. permanently by demonstrating strong economic and family ties to their 
home country.”).  
 19. See id. (“The term ‘immigrant’ is often used more broadly to mean any person 
who is not a U.S. citizen.”).  
 20. See id. (defining “green card” as “the informal term for ‘an alien registration card’ 
or Form I-551,” which is proof of legal permanent resident status).   
 21. See id.  
PLYLER STUDENTS AT WORK 571 




An immigrant visa for legal permanent resident status is normally 
obtained through family or employer sponsorship, but the INA limits the 
number issued annually.
23
 As of 2010, for example, there were 
approximately four million pending applications in the family-sponsored 
preference category.
24
  Mr. Garcia, who is awaiting the approval of an 
immigration petition filed by his father nineteen years ago, is just one 




In addition to the INA cap on family and employer sponsorship, there 
are also limits on the percentage of visas issued annually to applicants from 
particular countries.
26
  High demand, coupled with a limited supply scheme, 
has caused the State Department to develop lengthy waiting lists, where 
individuals like Mr. Garcia and Mr. Godinez-Samperio are placed in a “visa 
queue” and must wait for their “priority date” to become available.
 27
   Once 
that priority date arrives, the individual is eligible to apply for an immigrant 
visa.
28
  For those from Mexico, China, India, and the Philippines, who 
comprise the vast majority of green card applicants, this process can be 
particularly arduous.
29
  An unmarried, adult child of legal permanent 
                                                                                                     
 22. See id. (noting that “undocumented” may also refer “to those who overstayed their 
allotted time here, or those who violated the terms of their legal status.”).   
 23. See Visa Availability and Priority Dates, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,  
http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-processes-and-procedures/visa-availability-
priority-dates (last updated June 15, 2011) (“Family sponsored preference categories are 
limited to 226,000 per year and employment based preference visas are limited to 140,000 
per year.”).   
 24. See Stuart Anderson, Family Immigration: The Long Wait to Immigrate, THE 
NAT’L FOUND. FOR AM. POL’Y 1, 1 (2010), available at 
http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/Publications/NFAP_Policy_Brief_Family_Immigration.
pdf (according to data from the U.S. State Department and the Department of Homeland 
Security). 
 25. See generally Abcarian, supra note 4. 
 26. See Visa Availability and Priority Dates, supra note 23 (providing information on 
visa availability and priority dates). 
 27. See id. (noting that the length of time individuals must wait before receiving an 
immigrant visa depends upon, “[t]he demand for and supply of immigrant visa numbers,” 
“[t]he per country visa limitations,” and “[t]he number of visas allocated for your particular 
preference category”).   
 28. See id. 
 29. See Anderson, supra note 24, at 3 (“Enormous backlogs and waiting times plague 
the family preference categories.  For example, the wait time for a U.S. citizen petitioning 
for a brother or sister from the Philippines exceeds 20 years.”).  
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residents from Mexico, for example, will wait an average of seventeen 
years to receive a green card as a family-sponsored immigrant.
30
  Mr. 
Garcia—whose application was filed in 1994—expects to receive his green 
card sometime in 2019.
31
  Only after an applicant has obtained a green card 
and has lived as a legal permanent resident in the United States for five 
years, may the applicant begin the naturalization process to apply for 
United States citizenship.
32
   
These statistics demonstrate the lengthy and complicated route to 
becoming a legal permanent resident, and eventually, a United States 
citizen. And while it may be true that most undocumented immigrants made 
the conscious decision to enter this country illegally and involve themselves 
in that process, many of those who entered as children, like Mr. Garcia and 
Mr. Godinez-Samperio, did not voluntarily make that choice.  Nevertheless, 
this same path to citizenship applies those children, and it provides a useful 
starting point for considering the educational opportunities available to this 
country’s youngest undocumented immigrants. 
B.  Primary Education for Undocumented Immigrants 
As of 2013, there were approximately 11.7 million undocumented 
immigrants living in the United States.
33
 It is estimated that roughly 1.1 
million of them are children under the age of eighteen.
34
 These 
undocumented immigrant children have had the opportunity to access 
public education in primary and secondary schools nationwide, since the 
                                                                                                     
 30. See id. at 1 (noting that 26,266 visas are issues in this particular category every 
year, and that the average wait time for all other countries is eight years).  
 31. See Abcarian, supra note 4.  
 32. See I Am a Permanent Resident:  How Do I Apply for U.S. Citizenship?,  U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Feb. 2013), available at  http://www.uscis.gov/ 
sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/B3en.pdf (explaining that applying for U.S. citizenship 
is also possible for those who have been a permanent resident for at least three years, and 
who are “married to and living in a marriage relationship with your U.S. citizen husband or 
wife; or [h]ave honorable service in the U.S. military.”).  
 33. See Jeffrey S. Passel et al., Population Decline of Unauthorized Illegal Immigrants 
Stalls, May Have Reversed, PEW RES. CTR. 1, 6 (Sept. 23, 2013), available at 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2013/09/Unauthorized-Sept-2013-FINAL.pdf (“The 
estimated number of unauthorized immigrants peaked at 12.2 million in 2007 and fell to 11.3 
million in 2009, breaking a rising trend that had held for decades.”).  
 34. See Fact Sheet: An Overview of College-Bound Undocumented Students, 
EDUCATORS FOR FAIR CONSIDERATION, http://www.e4fc.org/images/Fact_Sheet.pdf (last 
updated Jan. 2012). 
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United States Supreme Court ruling in Plyler v. Doe,
35
 decided in 1982. In 
Plyler, the Court held that a Texas statute allowing local school districts to 
deny public education to children based on immigration status was a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.
36
  Rejecting arguments about the “harsh 
economic effects” of undocumented immigrants entering public schools,
37
 
the Court determined that “education provides the basic tools by which 
individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us 
all.”
38
  The Court also recognized the special circumstance of children 
brought to this country illegally, acknowledging that they “can affect 
neither their parents’ conduct nor their own status.”
39
   
Plyler is now recognized as the decision that “opened the schoolhouse 
doors to untold numbers of children who might otherwise be deprived of a 
basic education.”
40
  Mr. Garcia and Mr. Godinez-Samperio are just two 
examples of those who benefitted from the Supreme Court’s decision. Not 
only has Plyler survived unsuccessful attacks to limit its holding, it has 




                                                                                                     
 35. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that the Texas statute could not 
“deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public education that it offers to other 
children residing within its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers 
some substantial state interest.”). 
 36. See id. at 202 (reasoning that although undocumented immigrant children are not 
U.S. citizens, they are still protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which guarantees that no state shall, “deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws”) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 0 1). 
 37. See id. at 228 (“There is no evidence in the record suggesting that illegal entrants 
impose any significant burden on the State’s economy.  To the contrary, the available 
evidence suggests that illegal aliens underutilize public services, while contributing their 
labor to the local economy and tax money to the state fisc.”).  
 38. See id. at 221 (“We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation 
when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our 
social order rests.”).  
 39. Id. at 220 (stating that unlike undocumented children, “‘[t]heir parents have the 
ability to conform their conduct to societal norms,’ and presumably the ability to remove 
themselves from the States’ jurisdiction . . . . ”) (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 
770 (1977)).   
 40. See Ben Winograd, After 30 Years, Plyler v. Doe Decision Survives but Remains 
Under Attack, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (June 15, 2012), http://immigrationimpact. 
com/2012/06/15/after-30-years-plyler-v-doe-decision-survives-but-remains-under-attack/. 
 41. See id. (describing a 1994 California ballot initiative known Proposition 187, 
which would have forbidden undocumented students from enrolling in public schools but 
was prohibited from taking effect, and a 2011 Alabama initiative that would have required 
school districts to report students’ citizenship or immigration status to state authorities).  
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C.  Opportunities for Higher Education 
Protected by the Court’s decision in Plyler, approximately 65,000 
undocumented students now graduate from United States’ high schools 
every year.
42
 It is estimated that between 7,000 and 13,000 of those 
undocumented high school graduates are currently enrolled in colleges and 
universities across the country.
43
 The growing number of undocumented 
high school graduates beginning to set their sights on college has also 
caused legislative focus to shift toward access to higher education for those 
who have come to be known as “Plyler students.”
44
  
1.  Federal Law 
Currently, no state or federal law expressly prohibits the admission of 
undocumented immigrants to public or private colleges and universities in 
the United States.
45
 In fact, at the federal level, there have been several 
legislative attempts to encourage higher education for United States-
educated undocumented youth for more than a decade. These attempts have 
largely focused on passing the Development, Relief, and Education for 
Alien Minors (DREAM) Act,
46
 first introduced in the Senate in 2001.
47
  
Originally proposed by Senators Dick Durbin and Orrin Hatch, the 
                                                                                                     
 42. See EDUCATORS FOR FAIR CONSIDERATION, supra note 34.  
 43. See id.  
 44. See Miriam Jordan, Illegal Immigrants’ New Lament: Have Degree, No Job, 
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 26, 2005), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB111447898329816736 
(reporting that, “[i]n 2001, Texas became the first state to pass a law allowing undocumented 
immigrant students who graduated from a state high school to pay resident tuition at public 
universities.”).   
 45. See THE COLLEGE BOARD, Advising Undocumented Students (2012), 
http://professionals.collegeboard.com/guidance/financial-aid/undocumented-students (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2015) (noting, however, that institutional policies on admitting undocumented 
students vary, and that in Virginia, for example, some four-year colleges will refuse 
admission to applicants who are unable to verify their citizenship or legal residency status). 
 46. See S. 952, 112th Cong. (2011) (representing the most recent version of the 
DREAM Act introduced in the U.S. Senate on May 11, 2011); see also H.R. 1842, 112th 
Cong. (2011) (representing the most recent version of the DREAM Act introduced in the 
U.S. House of Representatives on May 11, 2011). 
 47. See Roberto G. Gonzales, Young Lives on Hold: The College Dreams of 
Undocumented Students, COLLEGE BOARD 22 (2009), available at 
http://professionals.collegeboard.com/profdownload/young-lives-on-hold-college-board.pdf 
(noting that the bill “has been repeatedly introduced and debated in Congress” and that 
“[a]lthough the DREAM Act has not yet been enacted into law, it has a large base of support 
both in and out of Congress”).    
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DREAM Act seeks to extend conditional permanent resident status to 
young, undocumented immigrants who pursue higher education in the 
United States.
48
 Specifically, the Act would allow those brought to this 
country illegally as children to remain in the United States without the 
threat of deportation for up to six years while they attend college or serve in 
the military.
49
  Although the criteria to qualify for conditional permanent 
residency has been modified since 2001, the plan generally requires that the 
undocumented individual: (1) has been continuously present in the United 
States for five years prior to the bill’s passage, (2) entered the United States 
before the age of fifteen, (3) has earned a high school diploma or GED and 
(4) is under the age of thirty-five.
50
  Under the most recent version of the 
DREAM Act, the undocumented student would become a permanent legal 
resident at the end of this six-year period, provided they have earned an 
associate’s degree, completed at least two years of military service, or 
worked for two years toward the completion of a bachelor’s degree.
51
 
Congress has not approved the DREAM Act, but in early 2012, President 
Obama used his executive power to promote a federal policy that 
effectively encourages higher education for young undocumented 
immigrants, with provisions similar to the DREAM Act.  
Following that directive from the President, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) began the Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA) program in June 2012.
52
 This federal policy allows DHS 
                                                                                                     
 48. See THE DREAM ACT PORTAL, http://dreamact.info (last visited Feb. 6, 2015). 
 49. See Gonzalez, supra note 47, at 22 (noting that the “DREAM Act is designed to 
allow undocumented immigrant youth who were brought to the country years ago as 
children to obtain legal permanent resident status if they remain in school through high 
school graduation and go on to college or military service”).  
 50. See S. 952, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011) (requiring additionally that “the alien has been 
of good moral character” and has not been convicted for any crime carrying more than a one 
year sentence under state or federal law).   
 51. See id. at § 5 (noting that legal permanent resident status will be revoked if the 
undocumented student fails to maintain “good moral character” or “abandon[s]” residence in 
the U.S. for more than 365 days during the conditional period); see also NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW 
CTR., DREAM Act Summary 2 (2011), available at https://nilc.org/dreamsummary.html 
(noting that “[s]tudents with conditional permanent resident status would be able to work, 
drive, go to school, and otherwise participate normally in day-to-day activities on the same 
terms as other Americans”).  
 52. See Memorandum on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to 
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children [hereinafter DACA Memo], from 
Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of the Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting 
Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Servs., and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration on Customs Enforcement 1 
(June 15, 2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-
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officers to exercise prosecutorial discretion in the pursuit of deportation 
proceedings against individuals: (1) who arrived in the United States before 
age sixteen, (2) are under the age of thirty, (3) have lived in the United 
States for at least five years, and (4) either have a high school diploma or 
are currently enrolled in school.
53
  In support of President Obama’s 
directive to implement the policy, Secretary Napolitano’s memorandum 
emphasized that immigration laws should not be “blindly enforced,” as they 
are not intended to “remove productive young people to countries where 
they may not have lived or even speak the language.”
54
  
2.  State Law 
Like DACA, policies designed to protect undocumented students and 
encourage the pursuit of higher education have been enacted at the state 
level as well. Currently, sixteen states have policies that allow 
undocumented students who completed their primary and secondary 
education in the state to pay the same tuition rates as in-state residents.
55
  
Three states—California, Texas, and Illinois—offer government-funded 
financial aid to undocumented college students as well.
56
  
Educational rights for undocumented immigrants also continue to be 
part of an ongoing debate at the state level.  In 2012, for example, sixty-
nine bills related to education for undocumented students were introduced 
in twenty-five state legislatures.
57
  Many of these focused on improving 
                                                                                                     
discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf (instructing that prosecutorial 
discretion is to be exercised on a case by case basis only if the individual satisfies a 
particular set of criteria). 
 53. See id. (noting that additional requirements include the individual have no prior 
felony or “significant misdemeanor” convictions and does not “pose a threat to national 
security or public safety”).  
 54. See id. (adding that “[a]s a general matter, these individuals lacked the intent to 
violate the law”).  
 55. See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Undocumented Student Tuition: State 
Action (May 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/undocumented-student-tuition-
state-action.aspx (reporting that the following states have equivalent in-state tuition rate laws 
for undocumented students: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, 
Utah, and Washington).  
 56. See NAT’L ASS’N OF STUDENT FIN. AID ADM’RS, Inclusive State Policy 
Environments: Undocumented Students, http://www.nasfaa.org/states/undocumented.  
/Inclusive_State_Policy_Environments__Undocumented_Students.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 
2013).  
 57. See NATI’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2012 Immigration-Related Laws, Bills, 
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D.  Access to Employment and the Practice of Law 
Although employment for undocumented immigrants is governed 
exclusively by federal law, and bar admission is regulated by the states, 
developments at both governmental levels support the provision of law 
licenses to qualified undocumented immigrants.  
Under current federal law, the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA) of 1986
59
 makes it a crime for employers to hire or recruit 
undocumented immigrants not authorized to work in the United States.
60
 
Like its provisions encouraging higher education, however, DACA 
represents an acknowledgment of the unique circumstances facing those 
brought to this country as children.
61
  As of June 2012, those approved for 
deferred action under DACA are eligible for employment authorization to 
work in the United States, renewable every two years.
62
  For those approved 
for DACA, like Mr. Godinez-Samperio, this serves as an additional form of 
encouragement for young undocumented immigrants to pursue an education 
that will lead to their career of choice.
63
 If that career requires a law license, 
legal developments within the past half-century provide additional support 
for the proposition that qualified undocumented immigrants may be 
admitted to state bar associations.  Although foreign-born individuals were 
                                                                                                     
and Resolutions in the States: Jan. 1-March 31, 2012, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/immigration/2012-immigration-laws-bills-and-resolutions.aspx#5 (last visited Feb. 
6, 2015) (noting that in 2011, 140 bills related education and immigration were introduced in 
37 states).  
 58. See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, In-State Tuition and Unauthorized 
Immigrant Students (Feb. 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/in-state-tuition-
and-unauthorized-immigrants.aspx (reporting that in 2013, four states—Colorado, 
Minnesota, New Jersey and Oregon—enacted new legislation permitting in-state tuition 
rates for undocumented immigrant students).  
 59. See Immigr. Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 
(1986).  
 60. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) (adding that this restriction applies, “regardless of 
whether such alien has received prior official authorization to . . . reside in the United States 
and regardless of any future official action which may be taken with respect to such alien”).  
 61. See DACA Memo, supra note 52 (noting that “[o]ur Nation’s immigration laws 
must be enforced in a strong and sensible manner. They are not designed to be blindly 
enforced without consideration given to the individual circumstances of each case.”).  
 62. See id.   
 63. See Silvia, supra note 10, at 368. 
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largely prohibited from practicing law in the United States for nearly two 
centuries,
64
 a pair of state supreme court decisions in the early 1970’s 
signaled a shift in the treatment of state bar applicants born abroad.
65
   
In 1971, the Alaska Supreme Court, in In re Park,
66
 invalidated a 
citizenship requirement for admission to the Alaska State Bar, because it 
was unrelated to an attorney’s fitness and competency to practice law.
67
  
The Park court also rejected concerns over loyalty and constitutional 
allegiance, disapproving of the argument that only natural-born citizens 
could demonstrate “an ‘appreciation of the spirit of American institutions,’” 
required to practice law.
68
 
A year later, the California Supreme Court expanded upon the 
rationale in Park.  In Raffaelli v. Committee Of Bar Examiners
69
 the court 
ruled that citizenship, as a requirement for state bar admission, violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
70
  There, the court 
found that California’s practice of excluding permanent resident aliens from 
admission to the State Bar had no rational basis.
71
  The Rafaelli court also 
rejected the argument that a lawyer, as an “officer of the court” must be a 
citizen—calling the conclusion a “non sequitur,” with “no demonstrable 
                                                                                                     
 64. See, e.g., Ex parte Thompson, 10 N.C. 355, 364 (1824) (prohibiting two European 
immigrants from practicing law in North Carolina, citing fears of “foreign allegiance,” “alien 
prejudices,” and concerns over allowing the practice of law to “fall into such hands as would 
lower it in the national opinion”).  
 65. See Kevin R. Johnson, Bias in the Legal System? An Essay on the Eligibility of 
Undocumented Immigrants to Practice Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1655, 1660 (2013) 
(“The 1970s saw the beginning of a general expansion of the constitutional rights of 
immigrants.”). 
 66. See In re Park, 484 P.2d 690 (Alaska 1971). 
 67. See id. at 692 (“The interests to be protected are the public’s interest in having 
competent practitioners, [and] the bar’s interest in ensuring that all attorneys in the state are 
qualified, thereby protecting its good name and reputation, and the courts’ interest in having 
reliable and officers . . . .”).  
 68. See id. at 693 (noting petitioner had been in the U.S. fourteen years when the case 
was argued, receiving his undergraduate and legal education here, and leading the court to 
conclude, “it could be assumed petitioner would appreciate the spirit of American 
institutions as much as one born . . . [in] the United States”).   
 69. See Raffaelli v. Comm. of Bar Exam’rs, 7 Cal. 3d 288 (Cal. 1972).  
 70. See id. at 294 (“A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from 
any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
 71. See id. (“‘We recognize the importance of leaving States free to select their own 
bars, but it is equally important that the State not exercise this power in an arbitrary or 
discriminatory manner . . . .’”) (quoting Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 238–
39 (1957)).  
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nexus between that status and a requirement that every lawyer be a United 
States citizen.”
72
  On this point, the Raffaelli court noted that although 
states may create rigorous standards for issuing law licenses, any given 
qualification “must have a rational connection with the applicant’s fitness 
or capacity to practice law.”
73
 
By 1973, the issue of citizenship as a prerequisite for state bar 
admission reached the United States Supreme Court, in In re Griffiths.
74
 As 
in Raffaelli, the Court found that while a state has an interest in regulating 
the character and fitness of its attorneys, a citizenship requirement for state 
bar admission violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
75
  In Griffiths, the Court rejected arguments by the state of 
Connecticut that “the special role of the lawyer justifies excluding aliens.”
76
  
Rather, the Court relied on Park and Raffaelli, emphasizing that depriving 
individuals of state bar admission because of citizenship is “inherently 
suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”
77
  It ruled that because non-
citizens “pay taxes, support the economy . . . and contribute in myriad other 
ways to our society,” it is proper for states to “bear a heavy burden” when 
depriving these individuals of opportunities for employment.
78
 
In sum, these decisions provide a strong basis for allowing 
undocumented immigrants like Mr. Godinez-Samperio to become licensed 
attorneys.
79
  Consideration of these decisions, coupled with the educational 
                                                                                                     
 72. See id. at 300–01 (“The traditional expression that a lawyer is an ‘officer of the 
court’ has not often been explicated.  He clearly is not a public office-holder in the literal 
sense (citation omitted) but we need not here explore the broader, metaphorical meanings of 
the phrase.”).  
 73. See id. at 294 (quoting Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 238–39 
(1957)). 
 74. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). 
 75. See id. at 724 (“Even in applying permissible standards, officers of a State cannot 
exclude an applicant when there is no basis for their finding that he fails to meet these 
standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory.”) (quoting Schware v. Bd. of 
Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957)).   
 76. See id. at 728–29 (rejecting the argument that exclusion from the practice of law is 
a an extension of the prohibition on an alien’s right to vote in every state, and their 
disqualification from holding public office). 
 77. See id. at 721 (noting that “[c]lassifications based on alienage, like those based on 
nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.  Aliens as a 
class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom such heightened 
judicial solicitude is appropriate,” (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 
(1971)) (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938))).  
 78. See id. at 722 
 79. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 6.  
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rights extended in Plyler and the protections afforded by DACA, are 
particularly in this regard, because federal law still makes state bar 
admission for undocumented immigrants a legal impossibility in any state 
other than California.
80
  Thus far, this debate has focused primarily on the 
personal experiences of Mr. Garcia and Mr. Godinez-Samperio, but such 
controversies could become more common, particularly as Plyler students 
graduate from law school, sit for the bar exam, and enter the job market.
81
 
III.  The Debate Over Undocumented Immigrants’ Right to Practice Law 
A.  Introduction 
On September 4, 2013, nearly four years after his law license was 
rescinded, the California Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Mr. 
Garcia’s case for admission to the California State Bar.
82
  On September 6, 
2013, just two days after those oral arguments concluded, the California 
legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 1024
83
—making California the first 
state ever to allow admittance to its Bar, “an applicant who is not lawfully 
present in the United States [who] has fulfilled the requirements for 
admission to practice law  . . . .”
84
  That law took effect January 1, 2014,
85
 
and on January 2, 2014, a unanimous California Supreme Court helped 
make Mr. Garcia the first known undocumented immigrant with a law 
license in the United States.
86
   
In contrast to Mr. Garcia’s personal victory is the outcome of Mr. Godinez-
Samperio’s quest for a law license.
87
  In the absence of a state law like 
                                                                                                     
 80. See 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a), Pub. L. No. 113-31 (2013) (making aliens who are not 
qualified aliens or nonimmigrants ineligible for state or local public benefits, including any 
“professional license,” as defined by §1621(c)(1)(A)).  
 81. See supra Part II.C.  
 82. See In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117, 123 (Cal. 2014).   
 83. See A.B. No. 1024, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013); id. at 8 (reporting that the bill passed 
29-5 in the California Senate and 62-4 in the California Assembly).   
 84. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6064(b) (2014) (providing further that “the 
Supreme Court may admit that applicant as an attorney at law in all the courts of this state 
and may direct an order to be entered upon its records to that effect”).  
 85. See In re Garcia, 315 P.3d at 124 (noting that “[a]fter the legislation enacting 
6064(b) was signed into law, we vacated submission in this matter and indicated that the 
matter would be resubmitted on January 2, 2014, after the new statute took effect.”).  
 86. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 6. 
 87. See infra Part III.B. (discussing issues of character, fitness and employability with 
respect to undocumented immigrants and the practice of law).   
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California’s, the Supreme Court of Florida relied on federal immigration 
law to determine that Mr. Godinez-Samperio was ineligible for admission 
to the Florida Bar.
88
 In its March 6, 2014 opinion, the Court reasoned that, 
“a license issued by a state cannot permit an unauthorized alien to perform 
work if such conduct is prohibited by federal law,” as, “[t]he federal power 
to determine immigration policy is well settled.”
89
  
The 1996 federal restriction behind these decisions provides a useful 
starting point for examining the inconsistencies in federal immigration law 
and policy.   
B.  Application of Existing Federal Law to Bar Admissions 
Currently, federal law renders undocumented immigrants ineligible for 
“any State or local public benefit.”
90
  Congress implemented this restriction 
in 1996, as part of the Professional Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Act (PRWORA).
91
 PRWORA was intended to reform the way America’s 
poor received federal cash assistance, and “end[] welfare as we know it.”
92
  
For undocumented immigrants, however, the law’s effect reached beyond 
financial support.
93
   
Codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1621, the ban on “public benefit[s]” for 
undocumented immigrants includes any “professional license, or 
commercial license provided by an agency of a State or local government or 
by appropriated funds of a state or local government.”
94
  Whether this 
                                                                                                     
 88. See Fla. Bd. Bar Exam’rs Re Question as to Whether Undocumented Immigrants 
are Eligible for Admission to the Fla. Bar, 134 So.3d 432, 434 (Fla. 2014) (“[A] a license 
issued by a state cannot permit an unauthorized alien to perform work if such conduct is 
prohibited by federal law.”).  
 89. See id. at 4 (quoting Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012)).  
 90. See 8 U.S.C. §1621(a).   
 91. See The Professional Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, H.R. 3734 § 401(a)(2), 104th Cong. (1996) (noting that one purpose of the bill was to 
“end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, 
work and marriage.”).   
 92. See BRENDON O’CONNOR, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE 
SYSTEM: WHEN IDEAS HAVE CONSEQUENCES 228 (2004) (noting that “beyond Clinton’s 
positive rhetoric, the PRWORA offered a much harsher world to the genuinely poor and 
needy.”).   
 93. See id.  
 94. See Pub. L. No. 113-31 (2013). (codified at 8 U.S.C. §1621(c)(1)(A)).  
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language applies to law licenses is the first point of contention over 
admitting undocumented immigrants to state bar associations.
95
  
The first consideration is whether a state court should be considered a 
“state agency” when it functions as the body charged with issuing law 
licenses.   The Attorney General of California, in her brief supporting Mr. 
Garcia, argued that § 1621 cannot be read to apply to the California 
Supreme Court in its capacity for determining state bar admissions. As head 
of the judicial branch, the Attorney General argued that the Court is “no 
more a ‘state agency’ than is the Legislature.”
96
  As to the Court’s 
relationship with the state bar association, the Attorney General contended 
that the bar, “has consistently been articulated as that of an administrator or 
adjunct,” and that the final authority to admit, deny or discipline attorneys 
rests with the state supreme court.
97
   
The issue is further complicated by the fact that Congress did not 
define “agency of the state” when it approved PRWORA.
98
 Accordingly, 
Mr. Garcia’s supporters argued the “usual and ordinary meaning” of the 
term should apply, noting that “agency” is generally understood to mean 
“an entity within the Executive Branch of government that acts as an 
‘agent’ of the Executive to enforce and administer laws enacted through the 
legislative process.”
99
 The California Attorney General also noted that 
when a state court uses its discretion to allow an individual to practice law, 
“it is exercising its inherent, constitutional authority as the head of the 




                                                                                                     
 95. See Brief for Kamala D. Harris et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, In re 
Garcia, 315 P.3d 117 (Cal. 2014) (No. S202512) 2012 WL 3236333 [hereinafter Harris 
Amici] (explaining that because the language of §1621(c)(1)(A) “qualifies the class of 
professional licenses,” it should not be read to include all types of licenses).  
 96. See id. at 7 (finding that state courts should be treated as “a separate department in 
the scheme of our state government” (quoting Brydonjack v. State Bar, 208 Cal. 439, 442 
(1929)).  
 97. See id. (quoting Keller v. State Bar of Cal. 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 1160 (1989), rev’d on 
other grounds, Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990).  
 98. See Harris Amici, supra note 95, at 17 (arguing that like “Justice Scalia’s 
memorable admonition that Congress ‘does not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes,’” it is 
unlikely that Congress intended to regulate Bar Admissions in enacting PRWORA, as law 
licensure is an area traditionally left to the states (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assn., 
531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).  
 99. See Harris Amici, supra note 95, at 8 (quoting Green v. State of California, 42 Cal. 
4th 254, 260 (2007)).  
 100. See id. at 9 (citing the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 
333, 378–79 (1866), where the Court, in deciding the role of federal courts in the admitting 
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Another contested issue is whether a state court uses “appropriated 
funds of a state or local government” in administering law licenses.
101
  If so, 
federal law flatly prohibits bar admission under § 1621.
102
  In Mr. Garcia’s 
case, supporters contended that no “appropriated funds” are expended, 
because bar admission does not rely on “state revenues allocated by 
statute.”
103
  This argument is relies on the fact that state bar membership 
fees are the primary source of funding to review law license applications, 
making any use of state appropriated funds “de minimis.”
104
  Because 
attorneys pay these fees out-of-pocket, and the cost is not subsidized by the 
state, the Attorney General of California argued that a state court’s role in 




As the primary voice of opposition in Mr. Garcia’s case, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) argued that only a state law like that enacted 
in California can override PRWORA’s prohibition.
106
  According to the 
DOJ, use of the word “professional license” in § 1621 is evidence that 
“Congress intended to act comprehensively in prohibiting the receipt of 
such benefits by undocumented aliens.”
107
  
                                                                                                     
attorneys to the federal bar, found that “admission or . . . exclusion is not the exercise of a 
mere ministerial power.  It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in 
numerous cases.”).   
 101. See Pub. L. No. 113-31 (2013) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §1621(c)(1)(A)). 
 102. See id. 
 103. See Harris Amici, supra note 95 at 10 n.6 (defining “appropriation” as “[t]he 
exercise of control over property; a taking of possession . . . .” or “[a] legislative body’s act 
of setting aside a sum of money for a public purpose.”) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
110 (8th ed. 2004)).   
 104. See In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117, 128 (Cal. 2014) (noting that Mr. Garcia’s 
supporters also that the “appropriated funds” language, “should be interpreted to refer only 
to public benefits that involve the payment of money or funds to undocumented 
immigrants . . .”).  
 105. See Harris Amici, supra note 95, at 10–11 (noting that “[a]pplicants for admission 
to practice shall pay such reasonable fees, fixed by the board, as may be necessary to defray 
the expense of administering the provisions of this chapter, relating to admission to 
practice.’”) (quoting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6063 (2013)).  
 106. See Brief for Stuart F. Delery, et al. at 3, as Amici Curiae for the United States of 
America Opposing Petitioner, In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117 (Cal. 2014) (No. S202512) 2012 
WL 3236333 [hereinafter DOJ Amici] (arguing “Title IV of [PRWORA] prohibits certain 
categories of aliens from obtaining certain public benefits, unless a state enactment directs 
otherwise.”). 
 107. See id. at 6–7 (determining that “[o]ther than the law license at issue here, Mr. 
Garcia and his supporters identify no other type of commercial or professional license which 
is not provide by an agency, provided by appropriated funds, or both.”).  
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With respect to the language of § 1621, the DOJ argued that the phrase 
“any professional license” conclusively excludes undocumented immigrants 
from the practice of law.
108
  Accordingly, the DOJ argued that the Court 
should disregard arguments about the use and meaning of  “agency” and 
“appropriated funds” in Mr. Garcia’s case.
109
 Even if the Court chose to 
consider that issue, the DOJ contended that state courts have always 
received “appropriated funds,” meaning that § 1621’s ban on public 
benefits plainly applies.
110
   More specifically, the DOJ noted that because 
judges and court employees are paid out of state appropriated funds, § 1621 
prohibits state bar admission for undocumented immigrants.
111
   
The DOJ also discarded arguments about the funding and 
responsibilities of the state bar association in issuing law licenses.
112
 While 
it did not dispute that state bar associations bear a majority of the cost and 
responsibility for determining candidates’ eligibility, the DOJ contended 
that the actual amount of state funding is irrelevant.  Specifically, the DOJ 
noted that “[t]he statute does not speak of funds appropriated for a 
particular purpose, or set a threshold amount of appropriated funds before 
the prohibition kicks in.”
113
 Accordingly, the DOJ argued that § 1621 
plainly applied to Mr. Garcia’s case, in the absence of a state law like the 
one subsequently enacted in California.
114
   
                                                                                                     
 108. See id. at 9 (arguing “[t]here is no need to definitively determine the meaning of 
‘agency’ . . . because Congress in any event covered the actions of this Court by making 
section 1621 applicable when a ‘professional license’ is ‘provided . . . by appropriated funds 
of a State or local government.’”) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)).  
 109. See id.  
 110. See id. (“[I]t is similarly undisputed that this Court and its officers are funded 
through appropriations . . . [t]herefore, Mr. Garcia seeks a ‘professional license’ . . . 
provided . . . by appropriated funds of a State or local government.’”) (citations omitted).  
 111. See DOJ Amici, supra note 106, at 11 (pointing out that this remains true, despite 
the fact that “no funds have been set aside specifically for the granting of licenses by the 
Court . . .”). 
 112. See id. at 10 (“The federal statute does not depend upon which entity performs the 
background analysis of the application, but rather depends upon the source of funding 
through which the license is ‘provided.’”).   
 113. Id. at 10–11 (arguing further that “the federal prohibition applies when 
appropriated funds are used whether or not the relevant benefit is directly conferred by the 
government . . . .”). 
 114. See id.  
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C.  The Division of Federal and State Control over Immigration and 
Licensure 
Although § 1621 represents the starting point in this debate, the topic 
of state bar admissions also raises a more fundamental question about the 
division of power between federal and state governments over 
undocumented immigrants—particularly when policies conflict on issues 
historically left to the states.  
A substantial body of United States Supreme Court jurisprudence 
supports the proposition that issuing law licenses is a traditional state 
function.
115
  Accordingly, “Congress is well aware of the traditional 
primacy of the state courts in regulating attorneys, so when it means to use 
its power to regulate attorneys, it has done so in ways that leave no room 
for doubt about its intentions.”
116
  This premise, coupled with the 
ambiguous statement in § 1621, has led supporters to argue that Congress 
did not intend to restrict states’ ability to make decisions about bar 
admission based on immigration status.
117
  Rather, advocates note that 
Congress “understands how to clearly indicate when it intends to impinge 
on [state] authority,”
118
 and that “Congress could have simply made 
undocumented immigrants ineligible for any state-issued professional 
license, but it did not.”
119
 
The counterpoint to this view, however, is that state action in the area 
of immigration must also be considered in light of the power of the federal 
government to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization” under Article I 
                                                                                                     
 115. See Harris Amici, supra note 95, at 12; see also N.Y. State Bar Ass’n. v. Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, 276 F. Supp. 2d 110, 128 (2003) (stating that “the regulation of lawyers and 
the practice of law have historically been recognized as the responsibility of the states, and 
not the federal government); see also Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) 
(noting “[t]he interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially greater since lawyers 
are essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice and have 
historically been ‘officers of the court’”).  
 116. See Harris Amici, supra note 95 at 11.  
 117. See id. at 19 (arguing that although Congress may legislate in areas traditionally 
reserved for the states, “[t]his is an extraordinary power in a federalist system.  It is a power 
that we must assume Congress does not exercise lightly” (internal quotations omitted) 
(quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991)).  
 118. Id. at 13 (comparing § 1621 to earlier Congressional actions applying to all 
individuals, including the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 18 
U.S.C. § 1962, which states that is “unlawful for any person who has received any income 
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity . . .”(emphasis added)).  
 119. Id. at 16.  
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of the Constitution.
120
  This has been interpreted by the DOJ to mean there 
is “no doubt that Congress can enact a law rendering unauthorized aliens 
ineligible for state benefits.”
121
  The reach of this constitutionally conferred 
authority has also raised questions about the balance of power between 
states and the federal government to regulate issues of immigration and 
employment generally. The DOJ argues that because federal law has 
“comprehensively regulated the field of alien employment,” it should also 
govern any authorization or licensure required for that employment.
122
  In 
support of this point, the DOJ noted that in Arizona v. United States,
123
 the 
United States Supreme Court found that “state laws are preempted when 
they conflict with federal law, including when they stand ‘as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and exclusion of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”
124
  A law allowing undocumented individuals to obtain a law 
license creates such an obstacle, according to the DOJ.
125
   
In response to this Article I argument, advocates have raised a 
competing constitutional concern—the Tenth Amendment.  Also citing the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona, the California Attorney 
General noted that, “[i]n preemption analysis, courts should assume that the 
historic police powers of the States are not superseded unless that was the 
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”
126
  Following that rationale, 
advocates in Mr. Garcia’s case argued that § 1621—and its failure to define 
operative terms such as “state agency” and “appropriated funds”—is an 
insufficient basis for concluding that Congress expressly intended to 




                                                                                                     
 120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.  
 121. See DOJ Amici, supra note 106, at 11 (adding further that Congress has power 
under the Constitution to “make the ineligibility provision applicable to all organs of state 
government, including the courts.”).  
 122. Id. at 2 (“[A]dmission to the bar has no bearing on the application of the federal 
statutes that govern an alien’s employment in the United States.”).  
 123. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (invalidating certain provisions of an Arizona immigration 
law enacted in 2010, including a provision that made it a crime for undocumented 
immigrants to work or apply for employment in the state).  
 124. Id. at 2495 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).  
 125. See DOJ Amici, supra note 106, at 2 (reiterating that “[u]nder the governing 
federal statutes, an alien’s employment authorization is determined solely by reference to 
federal law.”).  
 126. See Harris Amici, supra note 95, at 20 (quoting Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501). 
 127. See id. (noting that an “unambiguous statement is missing from section 1621” to 
suggest Congress meant to restrict the power of the state courts with respect to state bar 
admissions).   
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Despite these objections, the DOJ contends that § 1621 addresses any 
federalism concerns by providing for the “enactment of a state law . . . 
[that] affirmatively provides for such eligibility.”
 128
 This provision is what 
allowed for the California law prompted by Mr. Garcia’s case.  Even absent 
this provision, the DOJ noted that an undocumented immigrant could not 
legally raise a claim challenging § 1621 as an infringement on traditional 
state power, because of their undocumented status in the United States.
129
 
On this point, the DOJ also noted that even if an undocumented immigrant 
were able to obtain a law license under state law, they are still prohibited 
from working anywhere in the United States, unless it is authorized by 
federal law.
130
 The distinction between licensure and employment is 
considered further in the following section. 
D.  The Distinction Between Licensure and Employment 
While law licenses raise questions of federalism and the ability of state 
courts to determine bar admission independent of federal policy, the issue 
of employment after licensure is a separate matter.  The employment rights 
of undocumented immigrants are governed exclusively by federal law—and 
unlike limitations on law licenses, may not be overridden by the action of a 
state legislature.
131
   
Under current federal law, it is unlawful “to hire, or to recruit or refer 
for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is 
an unauthorized alien.”
132
  Congress adopted that provision in 1986 as part 
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).
133
 That Act was part 
of larger effort to reduce and deter illegal immigration into the United 
States.
134
 Under IRCA, employers are required to verify the immigration 
                                                                                                     
 128. See DOJ Amici, supra note 106, at 12 (referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) and noting 
that “Congress has accommodated state interests by allowing States to enact measures that 
would provide benefits to unlawfully present aliens.”).  
 129. See id. (arguing that this further supports the position that Mr. Garcia cannot 
challenge the § 1621 on Tenth Amendment grounds).   
 130. See id.  
 131. See The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-
603, 100 Stat. 3445; 8 U.S.C. § 1324 et seq. [hereinafter IRCA] (detailing the prohibition on 
employment of undocumented immigrants and providing criminal penalties for any 
employer found in violation).   
 132. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) (2013).  
 133. See IRCA. 
 134. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. 
SERVS.,available at http://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/immigration-reform-and-control-
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status of any prospective employee and ensure that the individual is legally 
authorized to work in the United States.
135
 In addition to its prohibition on 
the employment of undocumented immigrants, IRCA also introduced civil 
and criminal penalties for employers found in violation of the law. These 
penalties include fines of up to $3,000 per unverified employee and 
imprisonment of up to six months.
136
    
These federal restrictions on employment are an obvious hurdle for 
individuals like Mr. Garcia and Mr. Godinez-Samperio, but with respect to 
the practice of law, it is important to distinguish between licensure and 
employment.
137
 Though federal law may prohibit undocumented 
immigrants from working for employers in settings like law firms, courts, 
and governmental agencies, proponents argue this is not the relevant 
inquiry—because the ability to gain future employment is never part of the 
calculation in state bar admissions.
138
 Individuals with student visas, for 
example, are regularly granted law licenses, regardless of their ability to be 
employed in the practice of law. An act passed by the California legislature 
in 2005, for example, allows those who are ineligible for a social security 
number to apply for state bar admission.
139
   
It also true that obtaining a license to practice law does not necessarily 
mean an individual will seek employment in the United States. The amici 
for Mr. Garcia noted, for example, that undocumented immigrants could 
use a law license to provide pro bono legal services or advise clients outside 
the United States.
140
 Perhaps most significantly, undocumented immigrants 
                                                                                                     
act-1986-irca (last visited Feb. 6, 2015) (noting that IRCA was “passed in order to control 
and deter illegal immigration to the United States,” by instituting employment penalties and 
exercising increased border patrol).  
 135. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii) (providing that employment verification can be 
established with a valid United States passport or “resident alien card, alien registration card, 
or other document designated by the Attorney General . . .”).  
 136. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(f)(1) (providing that these penalties will be applied to 
employers engaging “in a pattern or practice of violations”).  
 137. See Harris Amici, supra note 95, at 22–23 (defining licensure as “an 
acknowledgement by this Court that a candidate has met the requirement for entry into the 
profession regardless of whether the licensee ever practices law,” which is a distinct from 
whether the individual may be legally employed).   
 138. See id. at 23 (noting that “[t]he State Bar and this Court do not generally inquire 
about whether an individual intended to be employed as an attorney before granting a license 
to practice law . . . .”). 
 139. See id. at 24 (citing CAL BUS. & PROF CODE § 6060.6 (2005) which, “establishes 
that foreign nationals may be admitted to practice law, even though they may not be able to 
be employed in the United States.”).  
 140. See id. (adding that “the ease with which individuals can communicate over the 
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could potentially be employed as solo practitioners or “independent 
contractors,” irrespective of federal work authorization.
141
   
While there may be the potential for legal work as an “independent 
contractor,” opponents of admission have raised concerns about the ability 
of undocumented immigrants to effectively serve clients based on the threat 
of deportation.
142
 In response to this concern, however, Mr. Garcia’s 
supporters noted that state bar associations generally do not consider 
immigration status for character and fitness purposes.
143
   Instead, 
supporters argue deportation should be treated like any other potential 
danger that could compromise the attorney-client relationship, noting that, 
“similar risks exist for all attorneys, any of whom could experience a life 
event—an illness, accident, disability, or other emergency—that interferes 
with their obligations to clients.”
144
   
Supporters in Mr. Garcia’s case also argued that current federal 
immigration policy does not affect the ability to advise clients as a solo 
practitioner or provide pro bono legal services.
145
  An amicus brief 
submitted by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) on behalf of Mr. 
Garcia, for example, argued, “these requirements do not generally apply to 
the work of persons who own their own businesses, such as bona fide 
independents contractors, or to non-remunerative work.”
146
  This distinction 
is based on Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regulations, which 
provide that restrictions on “employers” and “employees,” like those found 
                                                                                                     
internet and the global nature of the economy, it is possible to practice law from outside of 
the country, as do many other foreign nationals who receive a Bar licensure pursuant to 
section 6060.6.”).   
 141. See Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 20 as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117 (Cal. 2014) (No. S202512) 2012 WL 
3236333 [hereinafter ACLU Amici] (arguing that independent contractors are distinguished 
from the term “employee” under federal law).  
 142. See id.   
 143. See In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117, 134 (Cal. 2014) (determining that “‘[g]ood moral 
character’ has traditionally been defined as the absence of conduct imbued with elements of 
‘moral turpitude’. . . includ[ing] ‘qualities of honesty, fairness, candor, trustworthiness, [and] 
observance of fiduciary responsibility. . .” (quoting In re Menna, 11 Cal. 4th 975, 983 (1995) 
(internal citations omitted))).   
 144. See Harris Amici, supra note 95, at 23 (noting that “[a]ll attorneys are ethically 
obligated to plan for such eventualities by securing adequate representation for their clients, 
and courts may also intervene to protect a client (citing CAL BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6180, 
6190)).   
 145. See ACLU Amici, supra note 141, at 18 (arguing that this would not require work 
authorization from any employer subject to federal employment law related to immigration).  
 146. Id. at 20. 
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in IRCA, are only triggered when services or labor for wages are 
involved.
147
  Significantly, those same regulations, as the ACLU notes, also 
create a specific exception for “independent contractors.”
148
  Apart from the 
question of licensure, this led the ACLU to contend that Mr. Garcia’s 
employment as a solo practitioner would be proper based on the distinction 
in the DHS regulations.
149
 
There is also an argument that work as a solo practitioner could expose 
clients of undocumented immigrants to liability under federal law.  
According to the ACLU, however, “under the federal regulations, when a 
client retains a lawyer, the client is not an employer” of the undocumented 
attorney.
150
  Because a client is not an “employer”, they are not be exposed 
to civil or criminal penalties contained in IRCA,
151
 and, “therefore ha[ve] 
no obligation to refrain from retaining an unauthorized alien or to verify the 
work authorization status of the attorney.”
152
  
In response, opponents note that the distinction between licensure and 
employment need not be addressed.  According to the DOJ, because § 1621 
works to preclude the possibility of licensure entirely, employment as a 
practicing attorney is not possible for any undocumented immigrant, 
regardless of the setting.
153
  Reiterating that “authorization to work is 
determined exclusively by reference to federal law,” the DOJ noted that 
even if an undocumented immigrant did possess a state law license—as Mr. 
Garcia now does—any potential employer is subject to civil and criminal 
penalties if they “knowingly hire, recruit, refer, or continue to employ 
unauthorized workers . . . .”
154
  The DOJ amicus brief also notes that, “the 
                                                                                                     
 147. See id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(f) which states “[t]he term employee means an 
individual who provides services or labor for an employer for wages or other remuneration 
but does not mean independent contractors . . .”).  
 148. ACLU Amici, supra note 95, at 20.   
 149. Id. 
 150. Id.  
 151. See ACLU Amici, supra note 95, at 21 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(g) which states, 
“[i]n the case of an independent contractor or contract labor or services, the term employer 
shall mean the independent contractor or contractor and not the person or entity using the 
contract labor[.]” (emphasis added)).   
 152. Id. 
 153. See DOJ Amici, supra note 106, at 2 (concluding further that “the Court need not 
reach the question whether bar admission would imply that Mr. Garcia may lawfully work in 
the United States”).  
 154. See id. at 4 (citing 8 U.S.C. §1324a(a)(1)(A)); see also 8 U.S.C. §1324(B)(i) 
(noting that any employer who attempts to hire or knowingly employs an unauthorized alien 
“for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain” is subject to a fine or 
imprisonment of not more than ten years or both).    
PLYLER STUDENTS AT WORK 591 
United States does not endorse the assertion that any particular use of a law 
license would comply with relevant federal law.”
155
  Absent government 
authorization, the DOJ affirmatively rejected the idea that federal law 
would authorize legal employment for a licensed, undocumented immigrant 
like Mr. Garcia or Mr. Godinez-Samperio.
156
   
IV.  Recommendation 
A. Introduction 
While Mr. Garcia’s case suggests that law licenses for undocumented 
immigrants can be reduced to a question of statutory interpretation, Mr. 
Godinez-Samperio’s experience represents the bigger challenges facing 
first-generation Plyler students. Aside from the California law benefitting 
Mr. Garcia, highly educated young people living elsewhere in the United 
States, who were brought to this country illegally by their parents, continue 
to face challenges presented by inconsistencies in immigration policy. 
While members of the Plyler generation, like Mr. Godinez-Samperio, have 
pursued the education that policies like DACA seem to encourage, 
PRWORA’s nearly two-decade old prohibition on “public benefits,” places 
an obstacle between that education and its corresponding career 
opportunities.
157
 Comprehensive legislation is the most direct route toward 
removing PRWORA’s barrier, but congressional inaction on immigration 
makes that an unlikely solution.  
In the absence of legislation, a regulation promulgated by the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) clarifying PRWORA’s ban on 
“public benefits,” is an important first step toward fostering consistency in 
United States immigration policy. Just as DACA affords protection from 
deportation and an opportunity for lawful employment to qualified young 
                                                                                                     
 155. Id. at 14 (citing Matter of Tong, 16 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1978), which held that 
“self-employment qualifies as working without authorization”).   
 156. See id. at 14 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 274a.5 (2009) addressing the use of labor through 
contract, and stating, “individuals who obtain the labor or services of an alien in the United 
States knowing that the alien is an unauthorized alien with respect to performing such labor 
or services,” violates federal law).    
 157. See J. Austin Smithson, Educate Then Exile: Creating A Double Standard in 
Education for Plyler Students Who Want to Sit for the Bar Exam, 11 SCHOLAR 87, 103 
(2008) (“The current system of laws in the United States allows a Plyler student to receive a 
primary and secondary education, attend college and even law school; but, at the same time 
the United States criminalizes their immigration status, thus preventing them from fully 
developing their education . . . .”).  
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people, a DHS regulation could help ensure those same individuals are able 
to pursue all forms of employment—including jobs that require a law 
license.
158
  It is important to note, however, that this proposal is intended to 
be a short-term solution.  The fact remains that only comprehensive 
immigration reform from Congress will ensure highly educated young 
people are able to share the full range of their professional skills with 
society.  
B.  A DHS Regulation Clarifying PRWORA’s Prohibitions 
As the agency responsible for enforcing federal immigration law, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the authority to promulgate a 
regulation interpreting PRWORA’s prohibition on “public benefits.”
159
 
Currently tasked with interpreting and implementing laws enacted by 
Congress in the form of regulations, an interpretation of PRWORA’s ban 
on “public benefits” would properly come within the purview of DHS.
160
 
This addition would also be consistent with the body of DHS regulations 
found in Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), addressing 
“Aliens and Nationality.”
161
   
Under Title 8, DHS has previously issued several regulations 
clarifying federal law on benefits and employment for undocumented 
immigrants in other contexts.
162
  Under 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12, first 
promulgated in 2007, for example, DHS identified numerous classes of 
aliens authorized to accept employment in the United States.
163
 Among 
those eligible are “alien[s] having extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, 
education, business,”
164
 and “alien[s] whose enforced departure from the 
United States has been deferred in accordance with a directive from the 
President of the United States to the Secretary [of Homeland 
                                                                                                     
 158. See DACA Memo, supra note 52, at 1 (explaining that one purpose of the program 
is “to ensure that our enforcement resources are not expended on these low priority cases but 
are instead appropriately focused on people who meet our enforcement priorities.”).  
 159. See U.S CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., Title 8 Code of Federal Regulations, 
available at http://www.uscis.gov/laws/8-cfr/title-8-code-federal-regulations (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2014).  
 160. Id. 
 161. Id.   
 162. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12 (2014). 
 163. Id.  
 164. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(b)(13) (requiring that the alien’s employer acts as a 
sponsor). 
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Security] . . . . ”
165
 As to the latter category, which would include those 
approved for DACA, the regulations provide that those individuals are 
“authorized to be employed in the United States without restrictions as to 
location or type of employment.”
166
 A regulation clarifying that 
PRWORA’s ban on “public benefits” does not prevent those approved for 
DACA from obtaining a license to enter the legal profession could be 
addressed in a similar fashion.  
Until Congress is prepared to legislate on the issue of immigration, this 
type of regulation could serve as a temporary measure consistent with 
earlier executive action on federal immigration policy.  Just as DACA and 
the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12 reflect an effort to fully integrate the 
first generation of Plyler students into society, a regulation clarifying that 
PRWORA does not prevent those individuals from entering the practice of 
law strengthens that commitment. In her memorandum formally 
introducing DACA, for example, Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet 
Napolitano, noted that an exercise of prosecutorial discretion was 
appropriate for those brought to this country illegally as children, because 
“[a]s a general matter, these individuals lacked the intent violate the 
law.”
167
  Extending that rationale to remove a federal barrier to law 
licensure is equally appropriate, because it reflects the general premise 
behind DACA.  Specifically, it allows all young, qualified, individuals to 
realize the full range of educational and employment opportunities 
available to them, rather than suffer exclusion because of a status they did 
not choose, and a decision they did not make.
168
 
While it is true that law licenses are a state issue, an exercise of federal 
discretion to permit this “public benefit” would not conflict with that 
power.
169
  A regulation approaching law licenses in the way that DACA 
approaches employment would only remove a federal barrier based on 
                                                                                                     
 165. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(11). 
 166. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a) (emphasis added).  
 167. See DACA Memo, supra note 52, at 2 (stating that “many of these young people 
have already contributed to our country in significant ways,” and that “[p]rosecutorial 
discretion, which is used in so many other areas, is especially justified here”).  
 168. See Smithson, supra note 157, at 103 (defending a similar argument that refusing 
to allow undocumented students to sit for the bar exam, “perpetuates an ‘underclass’ of 
individuals within America’s borders, which is the exact circumstance the Supreme Court 
sought to avoid,” with its ruling in Plyler (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 (1982)).   
 169. See DACA Memo, supra note 52, at 3 (“This memorandum confers no substantive 
right, immigration status or pathway to citizenship . . . . It remains for the executive branch, 
however, to set forth policy for the exercise of discretion within the framework of existing 
law.”).  
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immigration status; it would not alter existing state authority over bar 
admissions.
 170
 Instead, a regulation that exempts law licenses from the 
PRWORA’s prohibition on public benefits would protect states from 
violating federal law by admitting undocumented immigrants to the state 
bar, similar to the way that DACA protects employers from violating the 
federal prohibition on hiring undocumented immigrants under IRCA.
171
  
Reforming federal law to allow for this eligibility, coupled with DACA’s 
opportunity for employment authorization, could also allow employers to 
legally hire undocumented young professionals to work in more traditional 
legal settings, including law firms, courts, and governmental agencies.
172
  
C.  Public Policy Rationale for this Standard 
As states have begun to increase accessibility to higher education for 
undocumented immigrants, and federal policies like DACA have created 
opportunities to gain employment through legal means, a DHS regulation 
clarifying that PRWORA is not a barrier to law licenses would foster 
consistency in existing immigration policy at the state and federal levels.
173
  
Rather than continue with an approach that supports the availability of a 
legal education for young undocumented immigrants, but shuts them out of 
the legal profession because it requires a license, a logical development in 
federal immigration policy is to extend them the opportunity for 
licensure.
174
  Allowing young, undocumented immigrants to receive work 
                                                                                                     
 170. See Michele Waslin, Can Deferred Action Beneficiaries Get Driver’s Licenses?, 
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Aug. 14, 2012), http://immigrationimpact.com/2012/08/14/can-
deferred-action-beneficiaries-get-drivers-licenses/ 
 (considering the impact of DACA on state eligibility requirements for a driver’s license, 
noting “[d]eferred action itself is not an immigration status” and those approved receive an 
employment authorization document and a Social Security number, which may or may not 
be enough for a driver’s license in some states).  
 171. See DACA and Workplace Rights, NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CTR., (Nov. 2012), 
http://www.nilc.org/dacaworkplacerights.html (noting that individuals approved for DACA 
may receive an Employment Authorization Document (EAD), which is a type of work 
permit allowing legal employment in the U.S.).  
 172. Id. 
 173. Id.; see also NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 55.  
 174. See Smithson, supra note 157, at 104 (referencing undocumented students 
prohibited from state bar exams, noting they “are faced with a similar problem as the 
undocumented children in Plyler who wanted to receive a free public education; they are 
prevented from furthering their education in America because of their undocumented 
status.”).  
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authorization for some forms of employment under DACA, but 
simultaneously prohibiting them from careers requiring a professional 
license, reflects a hesitance to fully integrate this group of individuals into 
society.
175
  A DHS regulation providing a current interpretation of 
PRWORA’s 1996 ban on “public benefits” is the most effective way to 
address current inconsistencies in immigration policy. 
An examination of the timing and rationale behind PRWORA also 
makes clear that its “public benefit” restriction pre-dates, and did not 
contemplate the educational trajectory of Plyler students like Mr. Godinez-
Samperio, who have earned a degree in law.
176
  Although the 1996 federal 
law works to prohibit law licenses for undocumented immigrants, this 
prohibition is not consistent with the purpose of PRWORA itself.  
Specifically, the purpose of the Act was to increase accountability for the 
provision of welfare benefits to America’s poor, and scale back 
governmental assistance to all recipients.
177
 Reforming the current approach 
to professional licensure at the federal level would not hamper these goals.   
In fact, a policy of inclusion for undocumented immigrants to the 
practice of law would likely further the overarching goals of PRWORA, 
despite its current preventative effects.
178
  With respect to § 1621’s ban on 
“public benefits” for example, one primary goal of PRWORA was to 
encourage self-sufficiency and lessen the burden on states to provide for 
those living in the United States without government authorization.
179
  
Another objective was promoting self-reliance and ensuring that “aliens 
within the Nation’s borders not depend on public resources to meet their 
needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities.”
180
  Allowing a DACA-
                                                                                                     
 175. See id. at 106 (“The current system encourages undocumented immigrant students 
to remain in the United States after graduating from high school, but sharply changes the 
landscape for those who continue to stay after high school graduation.”).  
 176. See 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1)(A) (2013) (making aliens who are not qualified aliens 
ineligible for state or local public benefits including, “professional license[s] . . . provided by 
an agency of a state or local government or by appropriated funds of a State or local 
government”).  
 177. See O’CONNOR, supra note 92, at 227 (“Advocates of the PRWORA asserted that 
time limits and work requirements are the best way of ‘rehabilitating’ recipients and getting 
them on the road to self-sufficiency.”).  
 178. See id. (“It legislated into action a system that attempts as much as possible to 
replace welfare with paid work, offering only temporary and limited government 
assistance.”).  
 179. See Harris Amici, supra note 95, at 29 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1601, Pub. L. 113-31 
(2013) (outlining the purposes for enacting PRWORA with respect to national policy on 
immigration and welfare)).  
 180. See id. at 29 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1601(2)(A), Pub. L. 113–31 (2013)).   
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approved individual—who has obtained an undergraduate and law degree 
in the United States, has passed a state bar exam, and has demonstrated the 
requisite character and fitness to enter the practice of law—seems to be well 
in line with the aforementioned goals of independence and economic self-
reliance that Congress hoped to achieve with the passage of PRWORA. 
This reform is also consistent with the right to public education for 
those brought to this country illegally as children.  In the decades since the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Plyler,
181
 states have extended that precedent 
beyond the K-12 setting.  State laws allowing undocumented immigrants to 
attend state universities and qualify for in-state tuition—effectively 
encouraging the possibility and pursuit of a professional degree—are just 
one example.
182
  As the California Attorney General noted in Mr. Garcia’s 
case, for example, “[a]dmitting qualified undocumented immigrants to 
practice law would be consistent with the legislature’s view that California 
is served by encouraging them to pursue an education.”
183
  The move 
toward increased access to higher education for undocumented immigrants 
in California and states across the county lends additional support to the 
removal of PRWORA’s national barrier to state law licensure.  To this end, 
a federal prohibition on “public benefits” should not stand in the way of 
allowing high-achieving students to share the benefits of their education 
with society. 
Though opponents to such reform would be correct in pointing out that 
an undocumented immigrant’s presence in the United States violates federal 
immigration law, such conduct does not necessarily preclude eligibility for 
state bar admission.
184
  In Mr. Garcia’s case, for example, the California 
Supreme Court ruled that, “every intentional violation of the law is not, ipso 
facto, grounds for excluding an individual from membership in the legal 
profession.”
185
  The Court supported this conclusion with the United States 
                                                                                                     
 181. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that the Texas statute could not 
“deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public education that it offers to other 
children residing within its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers 
some substantial state interest.”). 
 182. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 55. 
 183. See Harris Amici, supra note 95, at 3 (“It also would track state policies that 
acknowledge and encourage the positive contributions that undocumented immigrants make 
to society as a whole.”).  
 184. Id. at 21 (acknowledging that illegal entry into the United States can be charged as 
a misdemeanor under 8 U.S.C. § 1325, but that entry at a young age makes such an action 
unlikely, particularly since the five year statute of limitations has already passed in Mr. 
Garcia’s case).  
 185. See Garcia on Admission, supra note 82 at 22 (noting that when bar applicants 
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Supreme Court ruling in In re Griffiths, where it found that any attempt to 




As for character and fitness considerations after eligibility, the 
California Court found that immigration status should have no effect in this 
respect either.  Specifically, it determined that “the fact that an 
undocumented immigrant is present in the United States without lawful 
authorization does not itself involve moral turpitude or demonstrate moral 
unfitness so as to justify exclusion from the State Bar, or prevent the 
individual from taking an oath promising faithfully to discharge the duty to 
support the Constitution and laws of the United States . . . .”
187
  The Court 
went on to note that although illegal entry and unauthorized presence in the 
United States carry civil penalties and the threat of deportation, neither is a 
criminal offense or an act that automatically disqualifies an applicant from 
state bar admission.
188
  Additionally, once an individual is approved for 
DACA, the federal government no longer considers that person an 
undocumented immigrant for the purpose of incurring civil liability.
189
  This 
provides further support that a presumption in favor of eligibility for their 
admission to the practice of law would be proper.  
Reforming the federal approach to state bar admissions for those 
approved for DACA would also have no impact on an individual’s current 
immigration status or federal laws regulating employment for those who are 
undocumented.
190
  In fact, the California Supreme Court determined that “it 
would be inappropriate to deny a law license to such an individual on the 
basis of an assumption that he or she will not comply with the existing 
                                                                                                     
have committed a past crime, “the circumstances surrounding the commission of the act 
must reveal some independent act beyond the bare fact of a criminal conviction to show that 
the act demonstrates moral unfitness . . . .”) (quoting Hallinan v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 
65 Cal.2d 447, 459 (1966) (internal citations omitted)).   
 186. See In re Griffiths, supra note 74. 
 187. See Garcia on Admission, supra note 82, at 22.  
 188. Id. at 23 (determining the broad discretion of immigration officials make it 
unlikely they would pursue “an undocumented immigrant who has been living in this 
country for a substantial period of time, who has been educated here, and whose only 
unlawful conduct is unlawful presence in this country.”).  
 189. See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-
deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-process (last updated Sept. 9, 2014) (“Deferred action is a 
use of prosecutorial discretion to defer removal action against an individual for a certain 
period of time.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice).  
 190. See id. (“Deferred action does not provide lawful status.”).  
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restrictions on employment imposed by federal law.”
191
  According to the 
Court, even the inability to represent clients on account of citizenship does 
not make licensure improper or “necessarily preclude all possible uses of a 
law license.”
192
   
In conclusion, while states could formally enact laws like California’s, 
the most logical and efficient solution lies with federal reform.  Rather than 
require states to explicitly override PRWORA’s ban on “public benefits,” 
federal recognition of eligibility for a law license would create greater 
uniformity with immigration policy on education and employment.  It also 
furthers PRWORA’s goal of fostering self-sufficiency and economic 
independence.
193
  Moreover, this reform is consistent with the expansion of 
higher education opportunities for undocumented immigrants at the state 
level as well. Most importantly, this reform would represent a significant 
step forward toward greater integration of Plyler students into society. 
D.  Economic Benefits of This Standard 
In addition to being good social policy, there is also an important 
economic benefit associated with allowing undocumented immigrants to 
receive law licenses.  Such a grant would allow for a larger, more educated, 
and more affluent tax base to support the country.
194
  A shift toward 
expanded employment opportunities for undocumented immigrants, 
particularly those who are highly skilled, would provide this economic 
benefit at both the state and national level.
195
  More specifically, as 
                                                                                                     
 191. See Garcia on Admission, supra note 82, at 28–29 (concluding that the court relies 
on a presumption that all licensed attorneys will “comply with their ethical obligations to act 
in accordance with all applicable legal constraints . . . .”).  
 192. Id. at 25 (determining that Mr. Garcia would still be permitted to use his law 
license in ways that comply with existing federal employment law for undocumented 
immigrants); see also Harris Amici, supra note 95, at 24 (noting that Mr. Garcia could also 
teach courses in law or advise clients living outside the United States). 
 193. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 55; see also 
O’CONNOR, supra note 92. 
 194. See Raúl Hinojosa-Ojeda, Raising the Floor for American Workers: The Economic 
Benefits of Comprehensive Immigration Reform 1, IMMIGRATION POL’Y CTR. (Jan. 2010), 
available at http://www.ab540.ucla.edu/documents/immigrationeconreport_000.pdf 
(estimating that “comprehensive immigration reform would yield at least $1.5 trillion in 
cumulative U.S. gross domestic product over 10 years”).  
 195. See The Cost of Doing Nothing: Dollars, Lives and Opportunities Lost in the Wait 
for Immigration Reform, IMMIGRATION POL’Y CTR. 5–6 (Sept. 23, 2013) (estimating benefits 
at the state level and noting in Virginia, for example, “[t]he wages of unauthorized workers 
would increase by $1.2 billion, generating an additional $371 million in tax revenue and 
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immigration scholars like Dr. Raúl Hinojosa-Ojeda have recognized, 
“removing the uncertainty of unauthorized status allows legalized 
immigrants to earn higher wages and move into higher-paying occupations, 
and also encourages them to invest more in their own education, open bank 
accounts, buy homes, and start businesses.”
196
  PRWORA’s current 
limitations stand in the way of this potential economic progress.  
Though still in its early stages, DACA has shown the potential benefits 
of such an approach.  Since the policy was introduced in June 2012, 
approximately sixty-one percent of the 455,000 individuals approved for 
deferred action have obtained employment, fifty-four percent have opened 
their first bank account, and thirty-eight percent were approved for their 
first credit card.
197
  These statistics demonstrate the additional benefits that 
would come from removing the federal barrier to state bar admission for 
undocumented individuals who have earned a degree in law.   
Though opponents may contend that such an approach will lead to an 
influx of undocumented immigrants, that result is unlikely.  The limited 
application of this reform—to those brought to this country as children, 
who have obtained a degree in law, and passed a state bar examination, 
make such an influx doubtful.
198
  In fact, similar arguments were raised in 
opposition to the availability of in-state tuition rates for undocumented 
immigrants, but the effect of that reform has proved to be positive.
199
   
                                                                                                     
creating 27,000 new jobs”) (citing Raúl Hinojosa-Ojeda, The Consequences of Legalization 
Versus Mass Deportation in Virginia, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 2012)).  
 196. Id.; Hinojosa-Ojeda, supra note 194, at 9.  
 197. See Roberto G. Gonzales & Veronica Terriquez, How DACA Is Impacting the 
Lives of Those Who Are Now DACAmented, IMMIGRATION POL’Y CTR. 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/how-daca-impacting-lives-those-who-are-now-
dacamented (analyzing a national survey of 1,402 individuals between ages 18 and 31 years 
old who were eligible for DACA prior to June 2013).  
 198. See Basic Facts About In-State Tuition for Undocumented Immigrant Students, 
NAT’L IMMIGRATION L. CTR. 3 (revised June 2014), available at http://www.nilc.org/basic-
facts-instate.html (finding that only 5 to10 percent of undocumented high school graduates 
in the United States go on to college, meaning “[i]n most states, we are talking about only a 
few dozen or a few hundred particularly talented students.”).  
 199. Id. at 2 (“Each person who attends college and obtains a professional job means 
one less drain on the social service (and possibly criminal justice) budgets of the state and an 
asset in terms of payment of taxes and the attraction to the state of high-wage employers 
seeking well-educated workers.”); see also The Effects of In-State Tuition for Non-Citizens: 
A Systematic Review of the Evidence 3, THE LATINO POL’Y INST. AT ROGER WILLIAMS UNIV. 
(2011), available at http://www.rwu.edu/sites/default/files/lpi-report.pdf (finding that “in-
state tuition is correlated with a 31% increase in enrollment at institutes of higher education 
by non-citizens.”). 
600 21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 567 (2015) 
V.  Conclusion 
Although Mr. Garcia’s fight for a law license was ultimately 
successful because of the California legislature,
200
 Mr. Godinez-Samperio’s 
experience demonstrates the need for comprehensive reform.  Current 
federal policy does not reflect the changing profile of undocumented 
immigrants living in the United States.
201
 It is also inconsistent with the 
educational opportunities afforded to Plyler students,
202
 and DACA’s 
opportunity for employment authorization.
203
  For this country to reap the 
social and fiscal benefits of these protections, undocumented students who 
are prepared for the practice of law should not be shut out because a law 
license is deemed a “public benefit.”
204
  Until Congress is prepared to 
provide comprehensive immigration reform, a DHS regulation removing 
PRWORA’s barrier to law licensure for young undocumented immigrants 
is an important first step in this process.  
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